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Nontechnical Summary
In the context of the globalization discussion it is a popular hypothesis that
financial markets discipline fiscal policy. One specific aspect of this hypothesis
is the focus of this paper: the potentially disciplining effects of foreign
exchange markets under different exchange rate regimes.
This study is motivated by two considerations. First, there is a correlation
between the transition from fixed to flexible exchange rates in the early
seventies and the rise in industrial countries’ debt levels. Second, with the
introduction of the Euro there is another major change of the exchange rate
regime which could again be relevant for fiscal actors.
After a short survey of the relevant literature a „general to specific“ approach is
applied. On a general level, the impact of the exchange rate regime on fiscal
discipline is analyzed. Three main channels are identified. The exchange rate
regime affects fiscal behavior because it is of relevance for the political
objective function, for the interdependencies of the macroeconomic system and
for the government budget constraint.
The general approach reveals that a monetary union has some negative
characteristics in regard to exchange rate based fiscal discipline. The
depreciation threat which possibly is an obstacle for fiscal laxity is lost since
monetary union decreases economic openness. Apart from that obvious change,
the reaction of interest rate differentials to different fiscal behavior of  member
countries of a monetary union is limited to the default risk channel. In a
monetary union, any reactions caused by varying depreciation expectations or
the foreign exchange rate risk premium are impossible by definition. In contrast
to the monetary union regime, both the floating and the fixed exchange rate
regime seem to have some features more favorable for fiscal discipline.
Particularly, there is disciplining pressure from exchange rate related interest
rate determinants - i.e. the exchange rate risk premium and the expected
depreciation. In addition, the character of the nominal exchange rate as an
explicit political objective is supportive for fiscal discipline under fixed
exchange rates.
After these general considerations a specific model is presented to put more
precision to the impact of the exchange rate regime on fiscal discipline. The
fiscal authority is assumed to maximize an objective function. This objective
function is on the one hand positively affected by an increase in the primary
deficit - an assumption reflecting the public choice view on the political
attraction of deficits. The objective function is on the other hand negatively
affected by rising public debt and a nominal depreciation of the currency. The
macroeconomic system is represented by a two country model that is based on
2the monetary approach to the exchange rate under perfect price flexibility.
Assumptions of this model are perfect substitutability of foreign and domestic
currency assets and absolute purchasing power parity. This standard approach is
extended to include a default risk premium that is influenced by the change of
the public debt level. Furthermore, domestic monetary supply is assumed to be
influenced by the size of the secondary deficit. Thus there is a direct link
between deficits and monetary expansion which again is the crucial determinant
for nominal exchange rate changes.
The model puts more precision to some aspects of the problem as it was set up
in the general approach. In the model context the exchange rate regime is of
relevance for the structure of political preferences: Under fixed exchange rate
the political disutility from a depreciation is higher than under flexible rates. In
the model the transition to monetary union is interpreted as cutting the link
between domestic deficits and the money supply. In this sense monetary union
is equivalent to perfect central bank credibility. Nevertheless, monetary union
does not necessarily lead to more fiscal discipline. Two counteracting effects
are at work. On the one hand the loss of seigniorage control makes it politically
more costly for the fiscal authority to increase the primary deficit because this
deficit leads to a larger debt increase than it was the case with a minimum
control of seigniorage. On the other hand there is no depreciation resulting from
increasing deficits which reduces the political disadvantages of deficits for the
fiscal authority. The model provides the following message: Low debt countries
that used to pay much attention to the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate
are likely to have lower fiscal discipline after a transition to monetary union.
High debt countries that used to have a benign neglect stance on nominal
exchange rate changes are rather likely to be disciplined by the transition to
monetary union.
The model also clarifies the interrelation between the bailout problem and fiscal
discipline in a monetary union. The possibility of a weakening of fiscal
discipline in a monetary union is not dependent on any bailout effect associated
with the introduction of a common currency. Even with perfect credibility of a
no-bailout clause such as it was written into the Maastricht treaty, the transition
to monetary union could lead to higher deficits. If no-bailout provisions are not
credible in a monetary union, this of course further increases the likelihood of
more fiscal laxity under a common currency.
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Are the characteristics of the exchange rate regime relevant for the degree of
fiscal discipline? What are the conclusions for fiscal behavior in Europe after
the transition to EMU? These are the central questions that are analyzed in this
paper from a theoretical point of view. After a general discussion of these
issues, the optimization process of fiscal agents is analyzed in the context of a
model based on the monetary approach to the exchange rate. The model
conclusion is that monetary union leads to more fiscal discipline for high debt
countries that used to have a benign neglect stance on the exchange rate.
Contrasting to that, low debt countries that used to pay much attention to the
exchange rate in the past will behave less disciplined in the future.
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11 Introduction
1973 has been identified to mark a watershed for fiscal behavior in OECD
countries (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Prior to the first oil crisis, many industrial
countries had succeeded in reducing debt levels resulting from the financial
burden of the second world war. After the oil crisis, debt levels started to rise
again.
In their influential analysis, Roubini and Sachs ascribed this turning point to the
permanent growth deceleration taking place in the early seventies. Another
explanation hints at the rising influence of Keynesianism in economic policy,
which made rising deficits politically acceptable (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).
However, a third explanation for the 1973 watershed has so far failed to attract
much attention. The year 1973 stands for a fundamental change of the
international exchange rate regime. The Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates was finally replaced by a system of free floating. In fact, the
dummy that was used by Roubini and Sachs to measure the effect of the post-
1973 growth deceleration on fiscal policy and which the authors find to be
significant, can also be interpreted as a very rough exchange rate regime dummy
measuring the impact of floating exchange rates. It was McKinnon (1996) who
ascribed the fundamental change in fiscal behavior to the advent of unrestricted
floating in 1973 which „eliminated the already weakened monetary constraint
on fiscal policy in the United States, but it also finally terminated the Marshall-
Dodge restraints on running fiscal deficits in Western Europe and Japan“
(McKinnon, 1996, p. 33).
Is the transition to floating in 1973 and the subsequent rise of debt levels
coincidental or is there a causal relationship from floating to fiscal laxity? It is
not by accident that this question is posed in the end of the 1990s, when the EU
countries introduce a common currency and thus undergo a further fundamental
change in the exchange rate regime. If the exchange rate regime matters for
fiscal policy then the start of EMU as such will change fiscal behavior within
the EU. This is an aspect often missing in the analysis of the fiscal implications
of the Euro. This analysis normally focuses on the new institutions directly
targeting fiscal behavior such as the convergence criteria and the Pact for
Stability and Growth. Apart from these new institutions, however, the new
regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates is a major change that could have
implications for the constraints and objectives of fiscal decision makers. It is the
purpose of this study to shed more light on these relations.
Apart from the Euro context there is a second motivation for this analysis: This
work is to contribute to the intensive research on the determinants of public
deficits that has been under way since the end of the eighties. For a recent
2survey see Alesina and Perotti (1995b). With the background of exploding debt
levels since 1973 there have up to now been different directions to explain both
this average development and the very different individual debt histories of
industrial countries. A first wave of studies focused on political determinants.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Grilli et al. (1991) identified determinants such
as the type of government, political fractionalization or the durability of
governments to be of relevance. A second wave of studies changed the focus to
the budgetary institutions and their impact on the fiscal variables. Von Hagen
(1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1994) have led the way to take into account
the rules and regulations that build the framework for budgetary policies.
Resulting from these different approaches the understanding for the deficit bias
in modern democracies has been widened. However, it is striking that the
impact of capital markets on fiscal behavior has not yet reached this level of
understanding. Although in the context of the globalization discussion it is a
popular hypothesis that financial markets discipline fiscal politicians, there has
been only relatively few substantial academic work on this field, mainly in the
context of interest rates and the impact of public debt on risk premiums (e.g.
Goldstein and Woglom, 1992). Thus, analyzing the relationship between
exchange rate regimes and fiscal behavior, could add to a better understanding
of the determinants of deficits in a globalizing environment.
It is the intention of this paper to prepare empirical work on this field by
providing a first theoretical basis. Results of an empirical study are separately
presented in Heinemann (1998). In the following section 2, a short survey on
some insights from the relevant literature is given. After that, the interrelations
between exchange rate regimes and fiscal policy are examined in the context of
different exchange rate regimes. In section 3 a general approach is presented,
i.e. without restricting the analysis to the narrow assumptions of a single
specific model. After that, the analysis of section 4 will focus on the conditions
of a simple model based on the monetary approach to the determination of the
exchange rate. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions.
2 Insights from Relevant Literature
The above cited hypothesis of McKinnon concerning a disciplining impact of
fixed exchange rates has some tradition. Since Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) it is
a popular interpretation of officially declared exchange rate target zones that
these regimes serve the purpose to import credibility for a restrictive policy.
Monetary or fiscal laxity would sooner or later endanger a given peg to a
currency of a country with a more stable policy mix. According to authors like
Siebert (1996, p. 9) a devaluation of a peg is politically more costly than a
3depreciation under floating because „residents are made more alert on the value
of their currency by institutional arrangements“. Since giving up a peg is
supposed to be politically costly this imposes discipline on national agents.
However, the „tying one’s hand“-story could not be clearly supported by the
empirical facts. Disinflation costs for example were higher in the EMS than in
other OECD countries with flexible exchange rates (Fratianni and von Hagen,
1992) - a result not supporting the hypothesis of importing discipline and
credibility through the peg.
There is also no clear proof that EMS membership has led to fiscal discipline
and fiscal convergence of member states. On the contrary, Roubini and Sachs
(1989) find rather an increasing fiscal divergence in the EMS. However, both
authors do generally believe in a disciplining effect of an exchange rate peg on
fiscal policy, but they see it rather as a long run restriction which also often has
been neutralized by capital controls. In the short run a debt rising effect is
predominant when new participants of the EMS lose seigniorage revenues.
According to Heller (1997) the move to abolish most of the remaining capital
restrictions among industrial countries in the nineties tends to put more power
to the fiscal restraints of any fixed exchange rate regime.
Tornell and Velasco (1995) do not deny that the repercussions of deficits on
exchange rates can serve as a constraint for fiscal politicians. However, they
question the view that fixed rates impose more fiscal discipline than flexible
exchange rates. They do not accept the idea that the exchange rate regime itself
has an impact on the political costs of devaluation. If a devaluation is politically
costly e. g. because of its inflationary consequences, then these costs should not
depend on the question whether there is a peg or not. Tornell and Velasco turn
the conventional view upside down and ascribe more fiscal discipline to flexible
rates. In a dynamic general equilibrium model they analyze the intertemporal
distribution of devaluation costs resulting from imprudent fiscal policy. The
essential difference between fixed and flexible exchange rates in this model is
that under the latter regime the costs of unsound policy manifest themselves
immediately while under fixed rates it takes some time until the peg collapses
and the costs can be felt. The fiscal politicians are assumed to be uncertain to
remain in office after the end of the current term. This shortsightedness leads to
higher deficits under fixed exchange rates than under flexible ones. Tornell and
Velasco add empirical results from fiscal performance in sub-Saharan Africa in
the 80s where there existed both flexible rates outside and fixed rates inside the
CFA franc zone. According to these results countries under flexible rates are
more disciplined than CFA countries.
Looking at the literature as a whole the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and fiscal policy is far from being sufficiently understood. Neither is
there a clear theoretical framework nor has there been sufficient empirical
4studies for the industrial countries. If one widens the perspective to include the
exchange rate regime of a newly established monetary union the complex
becomes even more unsettled.
In regard to nominal exchange rate volatility, a monetary union is almost
identical to a system of fixed exchange rates. In regard to fiscal discipline,
however, monetary union appears for some authors to be rather the opposite
case to fixed exchange rates. Isard (1989) argues that under monetary union the
devaluation threat as a constraint for imprudent fiscal policy is missing.
Bovenberg, Kremers and Masson (1991) see a similar effect through the interest
rate channel. A rising debt burden is often associated also with a rising interest
rate risk premium for an increasing exchange rate risk. Thus a country with a
currency of its own has to pay for high deficits in form of rising interest rates.
With monetary union this kind of sanction is not any longer internal to a
country but has to be paid for by the whole monetary union. From the point of
view of the high debt country entering a monetary union, interest rates decrease
thus alleviating capital market pressure towards fiscal restraint.
The literature on the determinants of political reforms (Rodrik, 1996) stresses
the function of „crisis“ to be a catalyst for in the short-run unpopular but in the
long-run beneficial changes.  A crisis might be necessary for a government to
gain acceptance for unpopular reforms. With EMU one kind of crisis - exchange
rate pressure and/or heavy depreciations of the exchange rate - ceases to be
possible. Insofar exchange rate crises had a helpful function in speeding up
economic reforms there is the danger of decreasing ability to reform with the
advent of the Euro.
3 A General Analytical Framework
The purpose of this section is to present a general analytical framework for the
interrelation between fiscal policy makers’ decisions and the exchange rate
regime. In order to avoid at this stage any loss of generality the presentation of a
specified formal model is postponed to the next section. This "general to
specific" approach has the advantage to take account of as many as possible real
world dimensions of the issue.
It is assumed that fiscal politicians choose fiscal instruments - e.g. the level of
the government deficit - in order to maximize their objective function. This
maximization problem is constrained by the interdependencies of the
macroeconomic system and by the government budget constraint. In this setting
(see Figure 1), the exchange rate regime has a potential impact on the behavior
of fiscal politicians insofar it is of relevance for:
5− the politicians’ objective function (section 3.1),
− the interdependencies of the macroeconomic system (section 3.2) and
− the government budget constraint (section 3.3).
Figure 1: Relevance of Exchange Rate Regime for Political Optimization Problem
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3.1 Exchange Rate Regime and the Political Objective Function
The objective function of fiscal decision makers can conceptually be derived
from different sources: from the first priority of politicians in a democracy, the
wish to be reelected, but also from programmatic preferences of the relevant
ideologies or political parties. Traditional variables entering this kind of
objective function are: the rates of inflation and  unemployment, the growth rate
of the economy and of voters’ disposable incomes which in turn are influenced
by the level of taxation. Variables corresponding to programmatic preferences
are the distribution of wealth and income among the population in general or
among different interest groups and the level and structure of public spending.
Figure 1 includes the exchange rate as an element entering the objective
function in parentheses indicating that only under certain conditions this
variable can be interpreted as a direct political objective. One argument in favor
of the interpretation of the exchange rate as a direct objective is that in public
opinion marked depreciations are often associated with a crisis. An appreciating
currency is often attributed to economic strength of an economy.
6If the exchange rate has the character of a direct political objective, does this
refer to the nominal or the real exchange rate? From the point of view of
rational economic thinking there is a distrust in the importance of nominal
variables. On the other hand it would be unrealistic to restrict the political-
economic analysis to changes of the real exchange rate. Strong nominal
depreciations often lead to a public feeling of economic crisis even if these
depreciations simply correct a real appreciation that has built up before.
Therefore, it seems to be plausible to regard the nominal exchange rate under
certain conditions as a political objective.
However, the political costs of a nominal depreciation will probably depend on
factors such as the degree of openness of an economy and on the exchange rate
regime.
The more open an economy the more attention will be paid to the exchange rate.
In an open economy exchange rate changes are more relevant for larger shares
of the population than in a relatively closed economy. If an attitude of „benign
neglect“ really existed, it used to be a privilege of large economies as the USA
with a low degree of openness.
The exchange rate regime can be expected to be a relevant variable as well.
Although under a regime of freely floating exchange rates a depreciation may
gain some attention, it is very difficult to see a reason for any direct impact of
the nominal exchange rate on the popularity of a government. The case is
different if the exchange rate under a peg is explicitly declared to be a political
target. After such a commitment it is plausible to assume that voters will pay
more attention to the exchange rate. In the relevant target zone models this fact
is often taken account for in form of fixed costs that a government faces that
gives up a peg (e.g. Ozkan and Sutherland, 1994). Although some authors doubt
it - see in the preceding section the position of Tornell and Velasco - there is
clearly a case for the existence of some extra costs for the government to lose its
face if an explicitly targeted exchange rate peg has to be given up. Isard (1994)
argues that without the existence of these costs it is difficult to explain the
lower short run volatility of nominal exchange rates under systems of pegged
exchange rates.
In popularity functions1 the exchange rate has rarely been examined as a
potential determinant. In this kind of analysis there is the methodological
problem to differentiate between the impact of inflation and the impact of an
exchange rate change if the former drives the latter. Inflation belongs to the
variables that typically are included in popularity functions and which often is
found to be significant. Under relative purchasing power parity a significant
                                          
1 For a survey on popularity functions see for example Kiefer (1997, chapter 8).
7impact of the inflation rate would imply a significant impact of the nominal
exchange rate if this variable replaced the inflation rate as explanatory variable
in the regression. However, if relative purchasing power parity describes
nominal exchange rate movements in a satisfying way at all, then it is only on
the long run. In the short run nominal exchange rate movements are different
from relative inflation rates and thus lead to changes in the real exchange rate.
Adding the nominal exchange rate to the inflation rate in such a regression
means to control for changes in the real exchange rate. Hibbs (1982) is the only
study of popularity functions known to the author where the nominal exchange
rate is reported to be included and to be significant. It is the case of Great
Britain, where according to Hibbs governments of all parties in the postwar
period paid much attention to the role of sterling in the international monetary
system and the dollar exchange rate of the pound: „in Britain’s domestic
political life it has been viewed as an index of the nation’s international
prestige“ (Hibbs, 1982, p. 437). In his regression, Hibbs finds in the sixties and
seventies a depreciating Pound to be significantly associated with a decreasing
popularity of the incumbent government.
There is at least another period where the nominal exchange rate has definitely
been a direct political objective (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993): For the EU
countries in the years preceding the decision on EMU membership nominal
exchange rate volatility was one of the convergence criteria that had to be
fulfilled in order to qualify for the Euro.2 Any excess volatility of the nominal
exchange rate would have endangered the chances of a country to become a
member of the Euro zone.
Summing up, there is the presumption that the nominal exchange rate has the
function of a direct political objective under a peg but not under floating. A
high degree of openness can be expected to increase the attention for the
exchange rate.
What about the exchange rate as a direct political objective under the conditions
of a monetary union such as EMU? Within the participating EU countries there
is no longer a changeable nominal exchange rate, although it remains in relation
to the outside world. Looking at the criteria openness and exchange rate regime
EMU will probably lead to the exclusion of the exchange rate from any
objective function of national fiscal authorities: For the foreseeable future the
Euro will be a free floating currency vis-à-vis the Dollar and Yen and the degree
                                          
2
 Because the relevant criterion required merely to keep exchange rates within the „normal“
margins two years before the decision on EMU membership it was effectively softened in
August 1993, when normal margins of the ERM were extended from +/- 2,25% to +/- 15%.
8of openness of the European economies will decrease markedly with the Euro
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Openness (Ratio of Sum of Exports and Imports to GDP, 1995)
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3.2 Fiscal Policy and Exchange Rates under Different Regimes
Besides its relevance for the political objective function, the exchange rate
regime has an impact on the macroeconomic system. The way variables such as
unemployment, growth, interest rates and the exchange rate react on fiscal
policy, depends on the exchange rate regime. Thus, the exchange rate regime
affects the constraints of economic policy. It determines interdependencies and
the tradeoffs between different policy objectives.
The left hand side of Figure 1 describes these interdependencies in a very
general way. Of course, it would be far behind the scope of this section to
summarize these interdependencies comprehensively - this task would imply
condensing modern macroeconomics in a few sentences. Instead the focus will
be on the relationship between fiscal policy on the one hand and exchange rates
under different exchange rate regimes. There will be no intensive discussion of
the link between fiscal policy and output or employment under different
exchange rate regimes.
There are - apart from space limitations - two reasons for largely ignoring
output effects (an approach also applied in the model specification of the next
section): First, the deeper causes for the political popularity of deficits, as
identified in the relevant literature (see introduction) do not seem to stem from
9any trade-off between deficits and employment. The „naive“ approach where
politicians are assumed to use deficit finance in order to stabilize the economy
has been falsified on the basis of actual fiscal behavior. The popularity of
deficits has rather to do with limited time horizons of voters and politicians or
some kind of fiscal illusion. Because deficits are not used to stabilize output in
real life, it would be misleading to focus on such a trade-off. The second reason
for neglecting output effects is simply the fact that the relation between fiscal
deficits and growth is very much an open question. Recent empirical
investigation for OECD countries show that - against standard Keynesian
analysis - fiscal restriction may be expansionary depending on the structure of
consolidating measures (Alesina and Perotti, 1995a/1997, McDermott and
Wescott, 1996). Thus, identifying output effects of fiscal policy depending on
different exchange rate regimes would probably be a too speculative basis to be
a foundation for the further analysis.
Directing the focus on the consequences of fiscal policy for exchange rates
requires again the differentiation between real and nominal effects. Because in
terms of the political objective function it can be assumed that it is the nominal
exchange rate that attracts most public interest. Thus it is logical to stress the
nominal dimension.  Luckily, the statements of most theories concerning
exchange rate effects of deficits concern both dimensions, the nominal and the
real exchange rate. Real depreciations work in most models through a nominal
depreciation.
Flexible Exchange Rates
Under flexible exchange rates different theories come to contrary conclusion
concerning the impact of a deficit financed fiscal expansion on the nominal and
real exchange rate (Clark and Laxton, 1995). In particular, there are
contradicting conclusions from the standard Mundell-Fleming analysis and
long-run models that take stock-flow-adjustments into account in the tradition
of Branson (1977). In a Mundell-Fleming world with high capital mobility, a
fiscal expansion without any change in the monetary stance leads to an
appreciation of the exchange rate. This appreciation is caused by capital inflows
in reaction to rising interest rates. Under perfect capital mobility - which today
seems to be the relevant case for industrial countries - there is no output effect
and no increase in domestic interest rates. The demand effect of the fiscal
expansion is fully neutralized by the crowding out of net exports.
A depreciation resulting from a deficit financed fiscal expansion is possible,
however, if important assumptions of the Mundell-Fleming models are given
up. These assumptions include static expectations and the independence of
fiscal and monetary policy. If there is monetization of fiscal deficits or at least
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expectations concerning a future monetization there would be a tendency
towards depreciation. Here the relevance of the monetary institutions becomes
obvious. The degree of central bank independence is an important determinant
for the macroeconomic interdependence, especially the relation between fiscal
policy and inflation.
Furthermore, if assets of different countries are no perfect substitutes, the result
of Mundell-Fleming might not hold. It is possible that an increase in the public
deficit of a country increases also the perceived riskiness of this country’s
assets. This would in turn require an increase in the risk premium for these
assets leading to a depreciation of the currency (Giorgianni, 1997).
Finally, the Mundell Fleming model ignores long-run stock effects resulting
from the flows which are analyzed in models in the tradition of Branson (1977).
The long-run equilibrium is reached if the deficit (surplus) of the trade balance
is financed by the interest earnings on net foreign assets (is used to finance the
interest payments on net foreign debt). If there is a permanent increase of public
debt this in turn leads to an increase of net foreign debt which again has the
consequence of a permanent increase in the current account surplus. Thus the
long-run effect of a permanent increase of fiscal deficits is a currency
depreciation in the extent necessary to improve the trade balance (MacDonald,
1997).
Thus, the pattern suggested by theory is the following: on the short-run a deficit
will tend to lead to an appreciation, while on the long-run there is a clear
theoretical case for a depreciation. The short-run appreciation is, however, not
to be expected, if deficits - e.g. due to a high given level of public debt - put
monetary authority under pressure or lead to a significantly increasing risk
premium for the country’s assets.
An empirical verification of this pattern is difficult due to the forward looking
behavior of currency markets. Any change in fiscal variables that has been
expected before will not move exchange rates. Thus observable reactions of
exchange rates to fiscal determinants might not in every case be useful for the
test of the above theories. In fact, empirical tests are ambiguous as summarized
in Clark and Laxton (1995). Recently MacDonald (1997) found the Dollar and
Yen to react consistent with the stock-flow-approach but the DM to move in
line with the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model. Giorganni (1997) finds
the above described risk-premium channel relevant for the Italian Lira in the
period 1987-1994: In this time increasing fiscal imbalances of the Italian public
sector are associated with increasing risk premiums and a weak lira.
If it is right that there tends to be a difference between the short-run and long-
run reaction of the exchange rate on fiscal policy this is relevant for the impact
of the exchange rate regime on fiscal behavior. Assuming - as usual in political-
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economic modeling - a high political discount factor, politicians will be more
interested in the short-run consequences of their actions. This would be an
argument against the above cited hypothesis of Tornell and Velasco (1995) that
flexible exchange rates are disciplining because the punishment for lax fiscal
policy is immediate. If there is in the short-run - the politically relevant
perspective - an appreciation as a consequence for increasing deficits there is no
immediate punishment. The depreciation resulting on the long-run might be out
of the politically relevant time horizon.
Fixed Exchange Rates
In the standard Mundell-Fleming analysis under fixed exchange rates there is
the assumption of perfect credibility of a peg. What might have been a relevant
model in the earlier times of the Bretton Woods era, is obviously not relevant
any longer in times of globalized financial markets. The post 1973 experience
from fixed exchange rates or target zone institutions such as the EMS show that
the degree of credibility of a parity and the determinants of that credibility are
of crucial importance. The currency crises of the EMS and several collapses of
emerging market currencies - recent examples are Mexico 1994/1995, Asia
1997/98 and Russia 1998 - have motivated theoretical and empirical analysis of
these phenomena. A recent survey for the determinants of speculative crises is
Kaminsky et al. (1997).
The first theoretical approaches following Krugman (1979) have stressed the
importance of weak economic fundamentals as reason for the collapse of a fixed
exchange rate or a target zone. If the mix of fiscal and monetary policy leads to
a steady decline of reserves, this sooner or later provokes a speculative attack.
A second generation of models - for example Ozkan and Sutherland (1994,
1995) and Isard (1994) are characterized by the interpretation of a parity
collapse as the result of an optimizing behavior of the authorities that control
the parity. Defending a given parity leads to costs and benefits. Benefits might
arise from the use of the peg as a nominal anchor. Cost are involved if the
defense of the fixed rates requires higher domestic interest rates and leads to
output losses and increasing unemployment. The balance of costs and benefits,
however, is depending on many different determinants. Examples are the
foreign interest rate, the level and political costs of unemployment.
Of particular importance in the context of this paper is the relevance of the
stock of debt. The higher the stock of debt the more expensive is the defense of
a peg through an increase of domestic interest rates due to the higher interest
rate payments.
Besides widening the space of relevant variables these optimizing models lead
to the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations. Currency crises might occur
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without any preceding deterioration in economic fundamentals. These models
have a circular structure: Expectations of private agents take into account the
optimizing behavior of the authorities. Private expectations in turn are an
important variable determining the optimizing decision of the authority. Thus
there is the possibility of multiple equilibria: a change in expectations - even not
paralleled by a change in fundamentals - might change the outcome of the
authority’s calculus from sticking to a pre-announced parity towards giving up
the parity. These models must not be misunderstood. The message is not that
economic fundamentals do not matter for the probability of currency crises. A
deterioration in economic fundamentals is, however, not a necessary condition
for the appearance of a speculative attack. In any way, the more sound the
fundamentals, the lower the risk of a self-fulfilling change in expectations and
vice versa.
The relevance of self-fulfilling attacks is crucial for the interpretation of a
currency peg as a device for disciplining fiscal policy. If a speculative attack
tends to be something like a „fair punishment“ for fiscal laxity then the threat of
a speculative attack serves a useful purpose. If on the contrary, countries are hit
by attacks independently from the quality of fiscal and other fundamental data,
the speculative threat does not lead to more fiscal discipline.
Empirically, this issue has been answered differently. In their influential
analysis, Eichengreen et al. (1995) find support for the predominance of attacks
based on self-fulfilling expectations. In their survey, Kaminsky et al. (1997),
question this interpretation and find that a number of certain „fundamental“
variables are helpful to serve as leading indicators for currency crises. Among
these is the fiscal deficit.
Monetary Union
By definition there is no effect of fiscal policy on the nominal exchange rate
within a monetary union. While there might be consequences for real exchange
rates within the union, it is unrealistic to assume that these real changes gain
wide public attention.
Of course, there might be effects running from fiscal policy of an EMU member
country to the nominal exchange rate of the Euro vis-à-vis third currencies such
as the Dollar or the Yen. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these effects could
have any disciplining implications. From the point of view of a small EMU
member countries the impact of national fiscal policy on the external value of
the Euro can be neglected.  Even for a larger country the link between its fiscal
position and the external value of the common currency will be much weaker
than under a national currency. Apart from that, the transparency of this link -
important for a disciplining function - will be low: Under EMU, it will be hard
13
to ascribe exchange rate movements of the Euro to the behavior of a single
member country. As a whole, there is a free rider problem concerning the
common objective of a stable currency.
3.3 Exchange Rate Regimes and the Government Budget
Constraint
The fiscal authority’s optimizing decision is not only restricted by the
macroeconomic system. Another restriction originates from the government
budget constraint. As in regard to the macroeconomic interdependencies, the
type of the exchange rate system is of relevance for the quality of the constraint.
On the revenue side, the exchange rate regime might affect seigniorage and
taxes. On the expenditure side, there could be consequences for the interest
payments on the stock of debt.
Under flexible rates, the level of seigniorage revenues can be chosen
independently on a national level. Flexible exchange rates have the character of
a necessary condition for seigniorage revenues to be controllable by the fiscal
authority. At the same time flexible rates are no sufficient condition since with
an independent central bank seigniorage revenues are - independently from the
exchange rate regime - exogenous from the point of view of the fiscal
politicians. Therefore, it is only under the constellation of both flexible
exchange rates and the existence of a minimum influence of fiscal politicians on
monetary policy that seigniorage is a degree of fiscal freedom. With fixed
exchange rates, however, the fiscal authority can not choose the level of
seigniorage completely freely even if the central bank is dependent. The degree
of freedom in this setting depends on how fast a monetary expansion will
endanger a given exchange rate target.
Flexible exchange rates with a high degree of exchange rate variability tend to
be a an obstacle to the international exchange of goods, services and capital. At
least this is one of the central arguments in favor of EMU. Turning around this
argument leads to the conclusion that flexible exchange rates tend to shield an
economy from the international tax competition - although the empirical
relevance of this relation is an open question. Thus, the range in which the level
and structure of national taxation can be set without provoking sanctions from
international tax competition should be larger under flexible exchange rates. It
should be smaller under fixed exchange rates and smallest in a monetary union.
Under the conditions of unrestricted capital mobility interest payments on
national debt are under any exchange rate regime influenced by the world level
of interest rate. However, under flexible exchange rates there is more room for
interest rate differentials than under credibly fixed exchange rates.
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The difference between nominal domestic interest rates (i) and foreign interest
rates (i*) - measured as the yield in percent of government bonds of the same
maturity and with identical other characteristics such as liquidity and taxational
treatment - can be split up according to the following equation (see for example
Clark/Laxton, 1995). cde is the expected depreciation of the domestic against the
foreign currency in percent. ferp is the foreign exchange risk premium and drp
the default risk premium3, both in percentage points. Both risk premia
compensate for the different riskiness of domestic and foreign currency
government bonds. It is important to note the different character of both risk
premiums. While ferp corresponds to the riskiness of the domestic currency, i.e.
its volatility, drp is not related to currency considerations, but refers to the
relative default risk for domestic government bonds relative to foreign
government bonds.
(1)     i - i* = cde  +  ferp  +  drp
There is an equivalent formulation for expected real interest rates re with re = i -
πe, where πe stands for the expected rate of inflation. According to this
transformation, the expected real interest rate differential is equal to the
expected change of the real exchange rate and both risk premiums :
(1)’ re - re* = πe* - πe + cde + ferp + drp
This relation holds unless there are capital controls which would drive a further
wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates.
Equation (1) helps to clarify that the exchange rate regime is relevant for the
interest rate payments on the national debt through its impact on the level of
interest rates. Under monetary union and also under a fully credible fixed
exchange rate system cde and ferp are zero. Therefore it can be argued
(Mongelli, 1997) that those countries benefit most from moving from flexible
exchange rates towards EMU that had to pay high risk premiums for a high
uncertainty of the exchange rate development. The same is true for countries
that move from flexible exchange rates to fixed exchange rates of a minimum
                                          
3  More generally, drp stands for the country premium which besides the default risk also
relates to the risk for the introduction of capital controls or the implementation of
expropriation measures. For this analysis, it is sufficient to restrict the perspective to the
default risk.
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degree of credibility. By reducing exchange rate uncertainty through the choice
of the exchange rate regime the interest rate payments on public debt can be
reduced.
These considerations help to identify a major difference in the way interest rates
will react to public deficits under monetary union on the one hand and under
fixed or flexible exchange rates on the other hand. Under monetary union by
definition there can be no increase of  ferp and cde with an increase of deficits.
This is different under flexible rates: Here a rising deficit might increase both
elements. The same is true for fixed rates that are not completely credible: Here,
a rising deficit could - as described above - endanger the peg and lead to rising
interest payments for the public debt.
Independently from the exchange rate regime, an impact of deficits on the
interest rate payments can be expected through the default risk premium
channel. In the context of EMU, however, it has widely been discussed whether
the introduction of a monetary union might lead to a bailout presumption. If this
is the case there is a further difference in the determination of interest rates
under different exchange rate regimes. If monetary union leads to a bailout
presumption then the reaction of interest rates on an increase in deficits will
tend to be smaller because of the tendency of drp to be insignificant in a
bailout-regime.4
3.4 Synopsis
Looking at all effects together in a synopsis (see Table 1) one can conclude that
a monetary union has some negative characteristics with respect to exchange
rate based fiscal discipline. As by definition there can be no effect of fiscal
policy on nominal exchange rates, the exchange rate is no element of the
political objective function. Any monetary union furthermore decreases
openness and thus makes a position of „benign neglect“ more likely. Interest
rate differentials between member countries of a monetary union due to bad
fiscal behavior are limited to the default risk element. Apart from that, a
monetary union probably puts the strongest pressure on other sources of fiscal
revenue such as taxation and seigniorage.
Both the floating and the fixed exchange rate regime seem to have some
features more favorable for fiscal discipline. Particularly, there is disciplining
pressure from exchange rate related interest rate determinants (i.e. the exchange
rate risk premium and the expected depreciation). A distinct feature of any fixed
                                          
4
 See below section 4 for a further discussion of this interrelation.
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exchange rate or target zone regime is the character of the nominal exchange
rate as a direct political objective. It should be stressed, however, that the
disciplining effects of both flexible and fixed rates critically depend on the
assumption that high deficits lead to a depreciation or at least to depreciation
pressure. As discussed above this assumption has a good empirical basis.
Nevertheless it is far from being undisputed.
Before proceeding to a more formal view on the issue in a specified model it
has to be stressed that it is much to early to draw conclusions for the extent of
the real world deficit bias under different exchange rate regimes. The result that
monetary union is associated with a rather low degree of fiscal discipline is
something like a tautology if one starts from analyzing the disciplining effects
of changeable nominal exchange rates. However, this synopsis should have
served to identify the channels that could be relevant in this context. In the
following section the degree of analytical precision is to be increased at the
costs of some simplifications.
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Table 1: Synopsis on Disciplining Characteristics of Exchange Rate Regimes
Floating Fixed Exchange
Rates
Monetary Union
• effect of fiscal
deficit on
nominal
exchange rate
short-run: appreciation
(Mundell/Fleming) or
depreciation (e.g.
imperfect substitutes)
long-run: depreciation
(stock-flow-
equilibrium)
part of economic
fundamentals
negatively related to
the credibility of a
peg
no effect possible
• exchange rate a
direct political
objective
no yes no - openness decreases
markedly
• seigniorage as
a controllable
source of
revenue
if there is a minimum
influence of fiscal
authority on central
bank: yes
if there is influence
of fiscal authority on
central bank: level of
seigniorage possible
that is compatible
with the peg
no
• intensity of tax
competition
restricting
national
autonomy in
choice of tax
level and
structure
lower higher highest
• interest rate
differentials
vis-à-vis
interest rate of
reference
country
driven by exchange
rate expectations,
exchange rate risk
premium and default
risk premium
driven by default risk
premium and - with
incomplete credibility
of the peg - by
exchange rate
expectations and
exchange rate risk
premium
only driven by default
risk premium, even this
premium might vanish if
monetary union leads to a
bailout-presumption
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4 Fiscal Optimization in a Monetary Model of the
Exchange Rate
The general approach of the preceding section is now specified in the context of
a two country monetary model of the exchange rate with perfect flexibility of
prices. It is the consequence of any such specification that the complexity of the
real world problem is reduced. However, the chosen specification should be
helpful to put more precision to the issue of exchange rate based fiscal
discipline. This model is one example for a whole class of models that could be
constructed within the general framework developed above. According to this
given structure - as depicted in Figure 1 - the model consists of the objective
function of fiscal politicians, the government budget constraint, and some
relationships describing the interdependencies of the - very simple -
macroeconomic system: a domestic-foreign interest rate link, an equation
describing exchange rate determination and a monetary supply function.
Important assumptions of this model are the constancy of real output (in line
with the general approach above) and some features characteristic for the
monetary approach to the exchange rate: Domestic and foreign assets are
perfect substitutes, i.e. there is no foreign exchange risk premium. Purchasing
power parity holds so that there are no changes of the real exchange rate.
Objective Function of Fiscal Authority
The objective function, which is maximized by the fiscal authority responsible
for budgetary decisions, is given by
(2)     U( prd,
 
∆debt , cd )         with Uprd>0, U∆debt<0, Ucd<0
where prd stands for the primary deficit and debt for the stock of debt, both in
relation to income. cd is the nominal depreciation of the home currency in
relation to the foreign currency in percent per period.
On the one hand, the fiscal authority increases its utility through an increase in
the primary deficit. On the other hand, the costs of it - the increase in the debt
burden - has a negative impact on the utility. Furthermore, a depreciation has
also a negative impact on the objective function - although the extent of this
impact has to be discussed in detail below.
It is important to note the different economic and political character of prd and
∆ debt. It is the primary deficit where fiscal politicians according to the
political-economic approach can benefit from. A positive primary deficit
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implies that spending exceeds taxing. „To spend without to tax“ is an attractive
option for any government seeking reelection (Buchanan/Wagner, 1977). This
is true at least in the presence of finite time horizons or fiscal illusion on the
side of voters - characteristics leading to the invalidation of the Ricardian
equivalence. In such a setting, interest groups can be served and the costs can be
burdened on future generations whose interests are not completely taken into
account by present voters. Because the net effect from a primary deficit in terms
of political support is positive, the relevant derivative above is also positive.  In
contrast to that, the fiscal authority suffers from an increase of the debt burden
∆debt as such, for which prd is only one determinant among others. The
relationship between both variables also depends on the extent of seigniorage
and on interest payments on the stock of debt. The higher the debt increase the
more voters worry about this burden - even if the Ricardian equivalence does
not hold and voters expect only to pay for a certain share of this burden. There
is no political benefit for example from an increase in debt payments because of
rising interest rates leading to a faster increase of the debt burden. The relation
between the political benefit indicator prd and the political cost indicator ∆debt
stands for a trade-off in the optimization problem of the fiscal authority. To put
the same in simple words: Fiscal politicians like deficits but they hate an
increase of the debt level.
Government Budget Constraint
The relationship between the primary deficit and the increase of the debt burden
is described by the government budget constraint as given by:
(3) ∆debt = prd - me + r debt
The change of the debt-income ratio depends on the ratio of primary deficit to
income, the interest rate payments on the outstanding stock of debt, where r is
the real interest rate relevant for domestic government bonds. Furthermore,
seigniorage - here simply taken as the growth of the money stock in relation to
income, me - can be used to finance the primary deficit.
Interest Rate Determination
The determination of the real interest rate for government debt is in principle
already described by equation (1)’ which can be further simplified in this
model. Due to the assumption of perfect substitutability between home and
foreign currency assets there is no foreign exchange risk premium. Apart from
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that, due to the purchasing power parity assumption of the approach, there can
be no expectation of a real exchange rate change. Thus, the domestic real
interest rate r is simply the sum of the foreign interest rate r* and the default
risk premium drp. Due to the absence of uncertainty concerning the relevant
variables, the expectations superscript of (1)’ can be dropped.
(4) r = r* + drp
with drp = γ  ∆ debt
The default risk premium is assumed to be a linear function of the change in the
debt level. Of course, default risk should also depend on the level of the debt.
The debt level, however, has the character of an exogeneous variable in this
single period optimization problem, only the change can be influenced by the
fiscal authority. Thus only the default risk premium driven by the change in the
debt level will be relevant for the fiscal authority’s marginal calculus which
motivates this simplification.
γ is the relevant variable in the EMU bailout discussion. The more markets
expect the domestic country to be bailed out by the foreign country in case of a
debt crisis the smaller is γ which stands for the reaction of the default risk
premium to a change in the debt level. An implicit assumption of equations (3)
and (4) should be made explicit: All public debt is financed with variable
interest rates, i.e. changes of market interest rates affect instantaneously and
fully the interest payments on the stock of debt. Thus the debt service
immediately reacts to the foreign interest rate and changes of default risk. With
interest rates fixed for a longer period there would be a lagged adjustment of the
interest payments on government debt.
Exchange Rate Determination
In the monetary approach to the determination of the exchange rates, monetary
demand and supply on the domestic and foreign money markets determine -
together with the assumption of purchasing power parity - the exchange rate.
Here a very simple approach is sufficient. Foreign and domestic demand for
money are modeled in a classical way - i.e. money demand is not interest elastic.
Together with the constancy of real output assumption, currency depreciation is
simply driven by the relative growth of domestic and foreign money supply: cd
= me/m - me*/m*, which again is equal to the inflation differential π - π*. With
foreign monetary supply assumed to be constant (i.e. foreign inflation equal to
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zero) and the money stocks relative to income (m, m*) normalized to be both
equal one, this relation is simply:
(5) cd = me = π
The home currency depreciation in percent is equal to the percentage rate of
domestic monetary expansion - which at the same time determines the rate of
inflation thus fulfilling the assumption of purchasing power parity.
Monetary Supply
So far there is no link between fiscal deficits and currency depreciation - a
critical characteristic for any suggestion of exchange rate based fiscal
discipline. This link is integrated into the model through the following
assumption: The central bank is ready to finance a given share α of the
government’s secondary deficit through an increase of the monetary expansion:
(6) me = α (prd + r  debt) with 0 < α <1
α can be interpreted as a variable for the degree of central bank independence.
In the extreme case of α = 0, perfect central bank independence would cut the
link between fiscal deficits and monetary expansion. With the opposite extreme
(α = 1) the central bank would monetize the complete deficit.
Solution of Macroeconomic System and Political Optimization
In this setting, the only policy variable of the fiscal authority is prd. The fiscal
authority will set the primary deficit on a level where the marginal utility from
an increase in "spending without taxing" balances the marginal costs. The costs
result from the consequences of higher primary deficits on the change of the
debt level and the external stability of the currency.
The system (3) - (6) can easily be solved to derive the reduced form in order to
explain the endogeneous variables - ∆ debt, cd (=me=π), r - as functions of the
exogeneous variables debt, r* and the policy instrument prd (see appendix for
the derivation of the solution):
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with 0 < γ α( )1−  debt  < 1
(7) shows the debt increase following a primary deficit being the result of a
multiplier process. The first round debt increase concerns only the fraction (1-
α) that is not monetized by the central bank. This debt increase is followed by
consecutive debt increases through the rising interest rate on the stock of debt
due to the increasing default risk premium. All endogenous variables are
determined in a similar way. The restriction γ(1-α)debt < 1 is necessary for the
stability of these multiplier processes. The solutions for the currency
depreciation and the equilibrium interest rate are given by (8) and (9).
Given the stability of the process, all multipliers in (7) - (9) are positive. In the
context of the maximization problem of the fiscal authority, the first multipliers
on the right hand side of (7) and (8) are of particular importance. These
multipliers quantify the trade-off between the politically beneficial primary
deficit and the politically costly consequences in terms of the resulting debt
increase and currency depreciation.  Therefore, it is worth looking at how
changes in structural parameters affect these multipliers.
The sensitivity of the default risk premium to the change in the debt level as
measured by γ has an unequivocal impact: The higher γ, the stronger will the
change in the debt level and the depreciation of the home currency react to the
primary deficit. The same relationship is true for debt. The higher the initial
debt burden, the faster debt growth and depreciation due to a given primary
deficit.
The impact of a variation of  α - the share of the secondary deficit that is
financed through monetary expansion - is also unequivocal in relation to the
debt effect of a primary deficit. The higher this share, the lower the debt
increase for a given primary deficit. However, there is an ambiguous impact of
central bank independence as defined by α on the equilibrium relation between
the primary deficit and the exchange rate change. Only if γ debt < 1, a higher α
leads to a higher rate of depreciation for a given primary deficit. For realistic
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values of the variables this condition is fulfilled as can be demonstrated in the
following way: With a high debt-income-ratio for example of 1, a γ smaller 1
would fulfill the condition. γ =1 means, however, that the default risk premium
increases by one full percentage point for an increase of the debt-income-ratio
of 1 percentage point - a sensitivity far beyond realistic values. So it is plausible
to assume γ debt < 1 in the further analysis.
Given this interdependence, a rational acting fiscal agent will choose the
primary deficit to maximize his objective function - equation (2) - under the
constraints of the system as described by the reduced form (7) - (9). The first
order condition for a utility maximum is:
(10) Uprd = - (U∆debt 
d debt
d prd
  
 
∆
+ Ucd
d cd
d prd
 
 
)
The primary deficit is increased to a level where marginal utility of an
additional Euro of spending without taxing is equal to the marginal disutility.
The marginal disutility is determined by preferences and the macroeconomic
system, particularly the reaction of debt and exchange rates on an increase in the
primary deficit. In the specific setting of this model, (10) can be transformed to
(10)’ Uprd = - (U∆debt 
1
1 1
−
− −
α
γ α( )  debt + Ucd
α
γ α1 1− −( )  debt ).
Figure 3 depicts the choice of an optimum primary deficit (prd*) by the fiscal
authority. The above discussed impact of structural parameters in the system has
the following consequences for the optimum level of the primary deficit: The
higher the initial debt level debt and the higher γ, the higher are the marginal
costs of an increase in the primary deficit and the lower is prd*, consequently.
Thus, in Figure 1, prd** is c.p. associated with a higher debt or a higher γ
respectively than in the case of prd*. Concerning γ, this reflects also the
importance of no-bailout provisions for fiscal discipline. If there is a bailout
presumption, the reaction of the default risk premium to a change of the debt
level as measured by γ is small and the resulting optimum deficit is large.
The impact of an α variation on marginal costs of a primary deficit is equivocal.
A high share of monetization tends to reduce the debt effect but increases the
depreciation effect of a primary deficit. In Figure 3, it is therefore not clear
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whether c.p. prd* or prd** is associated with a higher α. Thus the preference
structure of the fiscal authority is important. If a depreciation is politically
cheap relative to a debt increase (i.e. -Ucd is low and -U∆debt is large) a rising
monetization of the deficit would lead to a larger prd*. This characteristic of the
model is worth to be underlined: Limiting access to seigniorage finance can
lead to lower or higher primary deficits. The outcome depends on the political
sensitivity towards debt increases relative to the sensitivity toward depreciations
- a result of relevance for the transition to monetary union as analyzed below.
Figure 3: Utility maximization of fiscal authority
prdprd*
Uprd −
−
− −
+
− −
( ( ) ( ) )U debt U debtdebt cd∆
1
1 1 1 1
α
γ α
α
γ α  
increase of
debt or
γ
prd**
increase or decrease of α
Impact of the exchange rate regime on the optimum primary deficit
Now the impact of the exchange rate regime on the politically optimum primary
deficit in this specific setting can be analyzed. Here, the exchange rate regime is
of relevance for political preferences, for α and possibly also for γ.
Concerning political preferences, these will be different under different
exchange rate regimes. Political sensitivity towards exchange rate changes will
be higher under any fixed exchange rate system than under floating. The
commitment to a fixed rate or an exchange rate target zone increases the costs
of a depreciation (see also section 3). In the terminology of the model: -Ucd
under a free float is smaller than -Ucd under any kind of exchange rate target.
With a monetary union, there is no nominal exchange rate change by definition
so that -Ucd is not relevant any longer for the optimization problem.
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The impact of the exchange rate regime on α, the share of monetization, is less
straightforward. In regard to de jure central bank independence a move from
floating to a fixed exchange rate regime as such is not relevant. This move
could, however, be relevant de facto if the central bank is obliged to defend a
given parity even in case of conflict with its monetary objectives. In the
following it is assumed that the degree of central bank independence is not
affected by going from floating to fixed exchange rates.
There is a clear interrelation between the degree of central bank independence
and the introduction of monetary union. The establishment of a common
currency is more than a change in the exchange rate regime because it
necessarily implies a change in the monetary regime. If the domestic and the
foreign country form a monetary union, there can no longer be a difference in
the speed of monetary expansion between both countries (at least under the
conditions of the monetary model as specified here). By the supra-
nationalization of the monetary supply the single country therefore must lose its
influence on seigniorage finance. In the above terminology this means that the
rate of monetary expansion me is defined to be exogeneous and equal for both
countries and α becomes equal to zero. In this model the introduction of
monetary union is identical to the establishment of perfect central bank
independence.
There is a less clear relation between the parameter γ and the exchange rate
regime. As motivated above, the degree of any bailout presumption is crucial
for the size of γ. It is hard to see any difference in explicit or implicit bailout
systems between floating or fixed exchange rates. There is also no direct impact
of a monetary union on bailout systems. However, in the EMU context indirect
effects feeding bailout expectations have been discussed (see for example Lane,
1993; Heinemann, 1995, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). Among the
arguments is the idea that within a monetary union the negative implications of
a national debt crisis in regard to the stability of the financial system spread
more easily across borders than it is the case with different currencies. With this
kind of negative externalities  increasing, the bailout presumption is
strengthened.
The impact of the exchange rate regimes on the variables of the model is
summarized in Table 2. On this basis the following results concerning fiscal
discipline under different exchange rate regimes can be derived.
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Table 2: Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Preferences and Structural Parameters
floating fixed exchange rates monetary union
Ucd -Ucd floating  <  -Ucd fixed irrelevant, because no
nominal exchange rate
changes
α α floating = α fixed
(if fixed exchange rate system do not reduce de facto
independence of central bank)
α = 0 because of supra-
nationalization of
monetary policy
γ no impact impact if transition to
monetary union feeds
bailout expectation
Relative to floating, fixed exchange rates lead to a lower level of primary deficit
that is optimal from the point of view of the fiscal authority - assuming that the
fixing of exchanges rates does not affect central bank independence.
More interesting is the comparison between monetary union on the one hand
and both other regimes (which are only different concerning Ucd) on the other
hand. Since there is no link between the marginal political benefits of a primary
deficit (left hand side of (10)’)and the exchange rate regime, this comparison
depends on the differences of marginal political costs (right hand side of (10)’).
Monetary union provides more fiscal discipline than fixed exchange rates
(which discipline more than flexible) if these marginal costs are higher, i.e. if
the following relation holds:
(11)  -U∆debt  
1
1− γ 
 
debt
>  - (U∆debt 
1
1 1
−
− −
α
γ α( )  debt +
Ucd
α
γ α1 1− −( )  debt )
The marginal political costs of an increase in prd under monetary union are
given on the left hand side whereas the right hand side stands for the marginal
political costs under fixed exchange rates, where Ucd is of the specific size
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corresponding to the fixed exchange rates case. U∆debt is not affected by the
exchange rate regime. (11) can be transformed into the condition
 (11)’ U   1 -   debt∆
U
debt
cd
> γ .
This condition (where γ debt is assumed to be smaller 1, see above) for a
disciplining effect of the transition to a monetary union reflects the above
discussed ambiguous effect of an α variation on deficits. With monetary union,
a depreciation as a punishment for primary deficits disappears. At the same time
there is a higher debt increase resulting from a primary deficit because the
access to seigniorage is lost for the fiscal authority. Both effects on the optimum
primary deficit counteract. As a consequence, monetary union provides more
discipline if political costs of a debt increase are large relative to the costs of a
depreciation. The higher the debt level and γ, the more likely is a disciplining
effect of monetary union.
Therefore, the differentiated conclusion from this model is: For low debt
countries where a lot of attention is paid to the exchange rate, the introduction
of monetary union will rather tend to weaken fiscal discipline. In contrast to that
for high debt countries with a „benign neglect“ stance on the exchange rate,
monetary union implies more fiscal discipline.
It must be added that these results have been derived on the basis that the
central bank is not perfectly independent already before the supra-
nationalization of monetary policy. If there was perfect independence before,
monetary union provides fiscal discipline identical to the situation under fixed
rates. It seems questionable, however, whether there can be perfect central bank
independence as long as a central bank is a national institution. It is often
argued, for example, that also the independence of the German Bundesbank
before Maastricht was far from perfect, because the Bundesbank Law defining
independence could have always been changed by a parliamentary majority in
the Bundestag.
Summing up, it is possible that monetary union is associated with less fiscal
discipline than fixed or even flexible exchange rates. It is important to note that
this result does not require any impact of monetary union on bailout
expectations. Condition (11)’ was derived under the assumption of an equal
bailout variable γ for all regimes. If monetary union actually feeds bailout
expectations, this further increases the likelihood of the transition to monetary
union weakening fiscal discipline.
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5 Conclusions
The analysis of the relationship between the exchange rate regime and fiscal
discipline based on the monetary approach of the exchange rate has obvious
limitations. The constant real income specification excludes any output effects.
Furthermore, effects that might arise through the channel of the foreign
exchange risk premium are not included in the analysis: Due to the assumption
of perfect substitutability of foreign and domestic currency assets (of an
identical default risk), a possibly important real world dimension is not taken
into account. An inclusion of a foreign exchange risk premium would probably
further weaken fiscal discipline in a monetary union relative to other regimes. If
there is a positive relationship between public debt and the foreign exchange
risk premium element in the determination of domestic interest rate this would
constitute a disciplining element that gets lost in a monetary union (see also
section 2). It is also important to underline the absence of any real exchange rate
effects. By the assumption of purchasing power parity changes of the real
exchange rate can not occur. Apart from that perfect capital mobility is
assumed. If there are restrictions to capital mobility disciplining effects will be
negatively affected under all currency regimes. Finally, in the model any impact
of the exchange rate regime on the intensity of tax competition is excluded.
Despite these simplifications the approach can put more precision to some
aspects of the problem as it was set up in the initial very general considerations
of section 3. These general considerations revealed the logical structure of any
possible impact of exchange rate regimes on fiscal behavior. Such an impact
could exist because the exchange rate regime is of relevance in respect of the
interdependencies of the macroeconomic system, the political objective function
and the government budget constraint. Behind this background, the specified
model clearly underlines the importance of the link between the exchange rate
regime and monetary institutions. In this model, the introduction of a monetary
union is identical to the establishment of perfect central bank independence.
With this interpretation it might be counterintuitive that a monetary union does
not lead necessarily to more fiscal discipline. However, although perfect central
bank independence might clearly be advantageous for price stability it might not
always lead to lower deficits. Central bank independence implies that the fiscal
authority loses any control of seigniorage. With this revenue source lost higher
deficits might be the consequence.
A further insight from the model is the relevance of political preferences and
their structure. If - ceteris paribus - for a fiscal authority there is a relative
priority for avoiding depreciations it will tend to behave more disciplined
29
outside a monetary union whereas within a monetary union the depreciation
threat has disappeared. If there is a relative priority for avoiding debt increases a
fiscal authority will rather behave more disciplined within a monetary union.
This is even more likely with a high debt level. Again the access to seigiorage
finance is central for this result. As this access gets lost in a monetary union, a
given level of primary deficit will lead to higher debt increases in a monetary
union than outside of it. Because of these counteracting effects one certain type
of country is rather likely to suffer from weakening fiscal discipline after the
transition to monetary union: a low debt country which used to pay much
attention to nominal exchange rate stability. For this country, the loss of the
depreciation sanction will tend to weigh heavier than the loss of seigniorage
control - with the result of higher deficits after the introduction of a common
currency. The opposite is true for a high debt country which largely ignored
nominal exchange rate changes. For this country monetary union is likely to
foster fiscal discipline.
The model helps to clarify the interrelation between the bailout problem and
fiscal discipline in a monetary union. The possibility of a weakening of fiscal
discipline in a monetary union is not dependent on any bailout effect associated
with the introduction of a common currency. Even with perfect credibility of a
no-bailout clause such as it was written into the Maastricht treaty, the transition
to monetary union could lead to higher deficits. If no-bailout provisions are not
credible in a monetary union, this of course increases the likelihood of more
fiscal laxity under a common currency.
The analysis furthermore reveals two channels over which a default risk
premium affects fiscal behavior: Besides the well known debt channel - a higher
default risk increases the growth of debt - there is an exchange rate channel: the
larger the sensitivity of the default risk premium to an increase in the debt
burden, the larger the depreciation that results from a primary deficit.
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Appendix
In matrix form, the system (3) - (6) can be written in the following way:
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The reduced form which supplies the equations (7) - (9) is
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where 1 1 0− − ≠γ α( )debt  is the condition for the non-singularity of the
structural matrix.
